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15 July 1953

NSC review completed - may be declassified in part

~~MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD~~

The following points were discussed at the PSB meeting on 15 July 1953

Present: Messrs. Walter Bedell Smith, Roger Kyes,
C. D. Jackson, Allen W. Dulles, George Morgan

(1) C. D. Jackson had an idea about the possibility of sending in token amounts of food [redacted] the subject which could be discussed at a later meeting. There was considerable discussion of food conditions in the Satellite countries, and Mr. Jackson said that the information as to food conditions in these countries was not very adequate but did not seem to indicate a catastrophic situation anywhere. Albania was a possible exception. WBS said that he felt that it would be premature to take action now. We had gotten dividends out of the East German proposal where the need is manifest. If we quickly followed up with offers, sure to be rejected, with respect to the Satellites, it would likely look like pure propaganda and would take away from East German operations. WBS thought we should wait a bit and meanwhile follow closely the food situation in these countries so that if there was a demonstrated food crisis anywhere we should be prepared to move. It was agreed that WBS would send a message to our respective embassies in the Satellite countries to report fully on food conditions [redacted]

(2) Mr. Jackson referred to an Air Force research project [redacted] relating to Russia, which had been 80% completed by now, and was threatened with termination before the final product was available. RK said that no final decision had been taken. The matter was up for discussion and he would see what could be done. I stated that I was somewhat disturbed at the consequences of terminating certain of these projects which might be of general interest to the intelligence community, and I thought it might be worthwhile to examine them and see if any should be carried on to completion to conserve the large investment that had been made wherever the production seemed to be of general utility.

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(3) I spoke to WBS about the activities of [redacted] who seemed to be swimming against the general current in his Point IV activities. I said that I thought it might be desirable for him to take a vacation somewhere [redacted] for the next month or so. WBS did not know about this and asked for a specific recommendation. [redacted]

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(4) I discussed the Egyptian situation and said that our people were disturbed over developments resulting from the disappearance of a British soldier [redacted] WBS said that the President's reply to Naguib should be helpful in offering a way out and did not seem to feel the situation was immediately critical.

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C-PP | (6) I spoke with C. D. Jackson with regard to the Presidential statement to be issued at the time of the signing of the special bill for admission to the United States of Lt. Jarecki. Mr. Jackson said that this operation was approved in principal, and I said that I would let him have our suggestions as to the draft of the statement. (Please see attached paper dated 13 July 1953 from Mr. Helms. I suggest someone get in touch with Mr. Jackson directly and let him review the drafts and our comments thereon)

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(7) There was a general discussion of the situation in Albania and it was felt we should see what came out of the special solarium discussion of July 16. WBS felt that we should begin working immediately with the Yugoslavs. I said that I thought some preliminary diplomatic work was necessary with the British and the Italians. WBS said that action by the Yugoslavs might be tied in with any action we took with regard to sending them a much needed shipment of grain. (I suggest we follow up this proposed grain shipment and see whether cooperation in the Albanian picture can be fitted into it)

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(8) While recognizing that the plans for exploitation of dissidents in the Soviet bloc (USSR Armed Forces) presented a most difficult problem which could only be tackled on a very long range basis, it was decided that a small committee should be set up under Gen. Erskine to tackle the preliminary studies. WBS suggested that Erskine consult Adm. Stevens. I referred to the project which Kenneth Strong had suggested on a long range study of Russian military tactics going back into the ~~long range~~ history of Russian military policy. WBS thought that this ought to be activated and referred to the interest which Air Marshal Slessor had had in this study. RK said that there was a man named Zander (?) working under Erskine at the Pentagon who had done a lot of study in this field. It was left that RK would talk with Erskine and get in touch with me.

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